The Marriage of Umm Ḥabībah and Abyssinia as Plan B
storySpeaker's framing: Before returning to the events in Makkah, the speaker wraps up the Abyssinia narrative with two final points: the marriage of Umm Ḥabībah and a reflection on why the Prophet (SAW) kept the Muslim community in Abyssinia even after he himself had established Madīnah.
The death of Ubaydullah ibn Jahsh:
ʿUbaydullāh ibn Jaḥsh, a cousin of the Prophet (SAW), had emigrated to Abyssinia with his wife, Ramlah bint Abī Sufyān, known as Umm Ḥabībah (رضي الله عنها). He died there, leaving Umm Ḥabībah a widow in a foreign land. She was the daughter of Abū Sufyān ibn Ḥarb, one of the most powerful enemies of Islām in Makkah, and had no family nearby who was sympathetic to her faith.
The marriage proposal through the Najashi:
After Umm Ḥabībah's ʿiddah (waiting period) was complete, the Prophet (SAW) sent her a marriage proposal, relayed through the Najāshī (Aṣḥamah). The Najāshī not only facilitated the marriage but, without being asked, paid the full Mahr on behalf of the Prophet (SAW) from his own wealth. He also personally organized a delegation to escort Umm Ḥabībah from Abyssinia to Madīnah. She became one of the Ummahāt al-Muʾminīn (Mothers of the Believers).
Her marriage had significant implications: she was the Prophet's wife while her father Abū Sufyān remained Islam's fiercest opponent in Makkah. This relationship may have been one of many factors that shaped the events leading to the eventual Conquest of Makkah.
Why did the Muslims stay in Abyssinia so long?, Plan B:
The Muslim community in Abyssinia remained there for approximately eleven or twelve years. They stayed through: the Prophet's Hijrah to Madīnah, the Battle of Badr (2 AH), the Battle of Uḥud (3 AH), the Battle of Khandaq (5 AH), and beyond. The Prophet (SAW) did not recall them throughout all of these years.
The speaker asks: why? Why keep 80+ people in Abyssinia when the Prophet is building an Ummah in Madīnah and needs manpower?
Speaker's answer (noting "Allāhu Aʿlam"):
The most logical explanation is that Abyssinia was Plan B. If Madīnah did not work, if the Anṣār revoked their pledge, if the tribal tensions in Madīnah could not be managed, if Quraysh crushed the young Muslim state, the community in Abyssinia was the fallback. They were safe, under royal protection, with food and security.
Only after the Battle of Khaybar (7 AH), when the Prophet (SAW) had expelled or subdued all of the immediate Jewish tribal threats around Madīnah and the Muslim state was firmly established, did the Prophet write to Jaʿfar ibn Abī Ṭālib telling him to bring all the Muslims back. The very day Jaʿfar arrived in Madīnah was the same day the Prophet returned from Khaybar, and the Prophet embraced him and said: "I do not know which delights me more, the victory of Khaybar or the return of Jaʿfar."
This shows, the speaker argues, that tawakkul ʿalā Allāh does not mean passivity. The Prophet (SAW) was simultaneously trusting in Allāh AND maintaining a Plan B. He was "tying his camel", planning, preparing, thinking through scenarios, while putting his ultimate trust in Allāh. Strategic planning and tawakkul are not opposites in the Sunnah.
A note on Abyssinian conversions:
Did the Muslims in Abyssinia make any large-scale impact in terms of Dawah to the locals? The speaker is frank: probably not significantly. There may have been isolated conversions. The Najāshī himself accepted Islām privately. But Islam did not take hold in Abyssinia through Dawah alone during this period. It came to the region through political power roughly 50-60 years later. The speaker notes this without disapproval, the companions' first priority was survival and practicing their faith freely, not mass Dawah in a foreign language and culture.